Introduction
One of the main objectives underlying the new Basel Accord is to substantially increase the risk sensitivity of the minimum capital requirements for banks (BCBS, 1999) . This has raised a lively debate in both policy circles and the economic literature about the potential procyclical effect such risk sensitive requirements might have on the macroeconomy , Daníelsson et al., 2001 , and Turner, 2000 . During a cyclical downturn, the quality of banks' assets is likely to deteriorate, which would increase risk exposure and, hence, capital requirements, exactly at a time when new capital becomes more expensive or, for weaker institutions, simply unobtainable (Jackson et al., 1999) . As a consequence, banks might be forced to cut back their lending.
Particularly in countries where corporate lending is provided mainly by banks, this would further weaken cyclical conditions into a so-called credit crunch, which would in turn exacerbate the downturn. New proposals by the Basel Committee have substantially reduced the possible procyclical effects of the new accord and thereby reduced the risks of financial instability. Yet the new capital requirements continue to be more risk-sensitive than before (as, by the way, they should in order to promote the financial soundness of banks). Hence, the issue of possible procyclicality continues to exist.
In the current debate on procyclicality, not much attention is being paid to the already existing potential procyclicality created by unsound provisioning. There is general agreement that unexpected losses by banks should be covered by bank capital, whereas expected losses should be covered by loan loss provisions or by future margin income. In reality, however, the distinction may be blurred. Whereas specific provisions are linked to impaired loans, general provisions are often based on a broad assessment of possible future losses on the entire portfolio. According to the Basel definition of capital, part of the general provisions counts as capital. Besides, when loan loss reserves and future margin income are inadequate to cover expected losses due, for instance, to a deterioration of the business cycle, these losses also eat into the capital reserve.
Given this close relation between provisions and capital, one could argue that a sound provisioning policy should be part of any regulations on capital requirements (Cavallo and Banque de France, 2001 ). On the other hand, the Second Pillar of the proposed accord -the Supervisory Review -may also provide scope for such a policy (Turner, 2000) . In any case, it is useful to investigate the present relationships between provisions and the business cycle on the one hand and between capital and the cycle on the other. This paper is precisely such an investigation into the provisioning behaviour of banks and their dependency on the business cycle. It seeks to shed light on the question whether such behaviour is procyclical too, as alleged. We distinguish the following two causal channels from the business cycle to provisioning. First, credit risk is most probably linked to the phase of the cycle. The 'classical view' assumes that risk increases in a downturn and vice versa. It is this behaviour which would cause procyclicality, as in a downturn provisioning swallows a larger part of profits just when more resources are needed for capital. An alternative view is that of and Lowe (2002) , who state that credit risks are built up during a boom, particularly when loan growth is relatively high. Second, provisioning may also depend on earnings, as assumed in the so-called income-smoothing hypothesis. An alternative explanation of smooth income is that prudent banks may behave far-sightedly and provide for lean years during fat years. The impact on provisioning of loan growth (as in the 'theory' of Borio and Lowe) as well as the effect of earnings would reduce the procyclical behaviour of provisioning.
A number of recent studies in the economic literature investigate provisioning behaviour and procyclicality. They tend to focus on certain aspects of provisioning or analyse one individual country only. We have opted for a wider approach, developing a more comprehensive provisioning model and employing a large set of 8,000 bank-year observations from the past decade and from all 29 OECD countries. This approach allowed us to compare bank provisioning behaviour across countries, and may reveal typical world-wide conduct regarding loan loss provisioning as well as idiosyncratic country-specific deviations. Also, we examine both loan loss provisions (i.e. the annual additions), which are supposed to be primarily determined by discretecycle-dependent -decisions, and the loan loss reserves level, which is more important for the financial soundness of the bank and for the relationship between loan loss reserves and capital.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the theory and practice of bank provisioning behaviour and its relation to procyclicality. Section 3 specifies our hypotheses and presents a regression model for provisioning. Section 4 reports the empirical results of this loan loss provisions model, while the next section provides outcomes of a loan loss reserves model.
The final section summarises and draws conclusions.
Provisioning in theory and practice
An important aspect of provisioning is its timing with respect to the business cycle and the related issue of procyclicality. The common view is that an economic upswing and rising incomes indicate improving conditions for firms and reduce the likelihood of loan defaults, whereas a recession will have the opposite effect. Banks are expected to reflect this feature in their decisions by lowering provisions during an economic boom and increasing them during a downturn. This cyclical bank behaviour is reported by e.g. Laeven and Majnoni (2002) and Bikker and Hu (2002) . According to this common view, the banks' provisioning behaviour is procyclical, meaning that it reinforces the current development of the business cycle. However, an alternative, countercyclical view states that credit risk is build up in a boom and materialises in a downturn , Lowe, 2002 . The favourable conditions of an economic expansion could lead to an excessive increase in credit lending and a less critical assessment of creditworthiness. 2 The countercyclical view associates this with higher risks and the build-up of financial imbalances that increase the likelihood of economic contraction. According to this view, provisions should be positively correlated with the business cycle, for banks should recognise this cyclical pattern of credit risk and build up loan loss reserves in good times to be drawn on in bad times.
This countercyclical behaviour assumes (far) forward-looking risk assessment by banks.
However, in practice, business cycle developments are hard to foresee, given their erratic duration and amplitude. In addition, accounting rules and tax constraints also contribute to increases in general provisions during downturns Provisioning leaves room for subjective judgements as to what extent losses are inherent in the loan portfolio at the balance sheet date. This holds in particular for general provisions which are meant for possible or expected losses, which neither have become manifest nor are related to individually identified loans. 4 Therefore, bank management may have some discretion in setting the appropriate provisioning levels, so that loan loss reserves can be influenced by several other considerations. In the literature, three main reasons are mentioned for the use of provisioning, other than purely providing a more realistic valuation of outstanding loans.
Firstly, the discretionary use of provisioning is frequently associated with the practice of earnings management. Allegedly, banks may reserve more in good years, for instance, because as a precaution -provisions are increased in fat years for use in lean ones -or, as is suggested in the literature, for credibility (not to say window dressing), i.e. presenting a fairly constant profit over the years. 5 Reporting a less variable income flow could be seen as signalling good performance from the viewpoint of stock price stability, external rating performance and lowering of funding costs, and management rewards Sinkey, 1988, and Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995) .
2 Keeton (1999) pointed out that there is empirical support for this statement, insofar as the increase in loan growth is driven by an expansion of loan supply. As loan growth is often demand driven -which is not harmful -the link between loan growth and loan losses is no 'law of nature '. 3 A similar provisioning approach is compulsive for Portuguese banks. 4 As opposed to specific provisions which reflect known and identified loan impairment. Kim and Santomero (1993) argue that a positive correlation between earnings and provisions may well be the result of optimal statistical forecasting with respect to loan losses and hence need not be due to As a result of such countercyclical provisioning policy, banks are significantly less procyclical than would appear to follow from their dependence on the business cycle.
Secondly, as far as general provisions also count as regulatory capital, 6 they may be used to manage the capital ratio. The relationship between capital and provisions has been documented by Kim and Kross (1998) and by Ahmed et al. (1999) . Among other things, these studies investigate the impact of the 1988 Accord on capital management by banks. The capital management hypothesis assumes that banks with low Tier 1 capital ratios are inclined to make more general loan loss provisions in order to keep their capital ratios adequate. Reasons for managing the capital ratio through provisions are the cost and time dimension of raising new capital on the market, the trade-off between dividend payments and retained earnings due to shareholder pressure and the tax regime (see below).
Thirdly, if general provisions are tax deductible as is the case is most countries, this in itself is an incentive to provision for the proper as well as for the more dubious reasons. Furthermore, if general provisions also count as regulatory capital, this incentive is even stronger, as a shift from pure (Tier 1) capital to general provisions lowers the tax burden (Cortavarria et al., 2000) .
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The upcoming new Basel Accord on capital requirements, expected to become effective in late 2006, has raised concerns about possible reinforcement of banks' procyclical behaviour. The new Accord makes capital requirements more risk sensitive, which could exert a procyclical influence on the macroeconomy, where banks play a major role as suppliers of credit (Carpenter et al., 2001 ). When during a downward slope of the business cycle the risk of business loans and the related capital requirements increase, there is the danger that banks become less forthcoming in extending loans, thus reinforcing the cyclical slowdown in what is called a credit crunch (Bikker and Hu, 2002, Lowe, 2002) . One important instrument to reduce this potential procyclicality is provided by the Supervisory Review process or Pillar II of the new Accord. Under this process supervisors are required to ensure that each bank has sound internal processes in place to assess the adequacy of its capital based on a thorough evaluation of risks. This is especially important for the development of credit risk during a cyclical downturn. Hence, more forward-looking risk misleading provisioning behaviour as supposed in the income smoothing theory. Hence, we cannot distinguish window dressing from prudent provisioning.
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The Basel Accord allows banks to include general loan loss reserves in Tier 2 capital, the lower quality part of regulatory capital, up to 1.25 percent of risk weighted assets. An accompanying constraint is that Tier 2 capital may not exceed the level of Tier 1 capital, the higher quality part of regulatory capital. There are, however, large differences in tax regulations across countries. Beattie et al. (1995) and Dziobek (1996) have documented these differences for a large number of OECD countries. In general, there are five main areas where national tax rules may differ: (i) the relationship between the tax and accounting treatment of loan loss provisions; (ii) the limit on the amount of provisions that is tax deductible; (iii) differences in the deductibility of general and specific provisions and write-offs; (iv) the choice of method used to determine allowable provisions; and (v) the existence of spreading provisions. All in all, these differences mean that banks in different countries face different incentives towards optimising assessment and timely covering of the cyclical component of credit risk, be it through general provisions or through Tier 1 capital, will take a central position in risk and capital management for the coming years.
3.
A model for loan loss provisioning
As explained above, both loan loss reserves and the capital stock are buffers to preserve banks' continued solvency by shielding it against, respectively, expected and unexpected loan losses.
They are formed, however, according to different principles. The optimum capital stock is determined mainly by strategic and long-term arguments reflecting, among other things, the trade-off between risk and return on assets on the one hand and regulatory requirements on the other. Provisions are linked more directly to the quality of the loan portfolio and hence more susceptible to short-term fluctuations arising from the macroeconomic environment and developments in the solvency of individual counterparties. This holds in particular for specific provisions, which are directly linked to impaired loans. Provisioning may also be affected by country-specific circumstances with respect to accounting, regulatory and tax rules or to bank behaviour such as income smoothing or forward-looking risk assessment. Given such discretionary features, a model explaining the level of provisions should prominently contain variables that relate to the underlying decision making process of provisioning.
This paper investigates both the loan loss provisions (the annual addition) and the loan loss reserves (the level) because the two are different in character. Loan loss provisions reflect managerial decisions at a point in time, which may be more likely to be ad hoc discretionary decisions.
Loan loss reserves reflect the year-on-year accumulated net provisioning that, on average, ought to reflect mainly actual expected loan losses. Analysts, regulators, management and auditors tend to see the loan loss reserves as important information regarding the credit portfolio's quality.
Cavallo and Majnoni (2002) developed a simple theoretical model for banks' profits that
incorporates the business cycle and shows the impact of various provisioning regimes on earnings, income taxes and the capital ratio:
their provisioning , resulting in different practices around the world. This also means that banks may differ in their response to other variables that determine the level of provisions.
where π are bank profits, L loans, r B the risk-free interest rate, E(d) the expected default ratio on loans as an average through the business cycle, k the risk premium, r D the funding rate, OC operating costs, BL bank losses on loans and LLR loan loss reserves. Loans and bank losses on loans are stochastic variables with a cyclical pattern, respectively, positively and negatively correlated with the business cycle. The business cycle feeds into bank profits through bank losses (BL), the demand for loans (L) and, probably, the levels of the interest rates. The expected default ratio E(d) should not depend on the business cycle, as it is a (so-called) through-the-cycle rate, but in reality such rates are still somewhat cyclical.
The net loan loss provisions, γE ( According to this model, it is optimal practice for banks -in terms of profit, tax payments and capital adequacy -to follow the full provisioning strategy (as long as loan loss reserves remain positive). This way profits are insulated from the negative impact of loan losses and the only source of variability in banks' earnings is the cyclical pattern of demand for loans over the business cycle. The model gives a highly stylised and simplified exposition of the merits of dynamic provisioning. It incorporates the business cycle through the cyclical behaviour of lending and problem loans. Nevertheless, in reality, these variables are not the only determinants of bank profitability. 8 We will employ a more elaborated multi-country model, including the core elements of the gross loan loss provisions term γE(d)L discussed above, which includes proxies for the business cycle, various bank specific balance sheet characteristics and dummy variables for country-specific conditions. This model for loan loss provisions (LLP) reads as:
The flow variable LLP is scaled by the stock variable 'total assets', for which we have taken the average of the current and preceding year. The subindices refer to bank i from country j in year t.
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See Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000), and Bikker and Hu (2002) for more information on the determinants of bank profitability.
The dependent variables can be subdivided into (i) the macroeconomic variables of the banks' own country, GDP growth and the unemployment rate (UNEMPL), (ii) various bank specific variables, earnings (EARN), loans growth (∆ ln LOANS), loans as share of total assets and the equity or capital ratio, and (iii) country dummies (d j ). These variables are explained in greater detail in Annex 1.
The data
We use pooled cross-section and time series data of individual banks' balance sheet items from 29 OECD countries (listed in Table 1 ) and country-specific macroeconomic indicators for these countries, over an eleven year period from 1991 to 2001. This episode covers a full business cycle for all the countries included. In general, the cycle develops from a trough in or after 1991, an economic boom in the nineties to a slowdown beginning in 2001. Some countries, such as Korea, Mexico and Turkey, experienced a severe financial crisis during this period. The macroeconomic data are from the OECD and the IMF (see Bikker and Hu, 2002) , whereas the balance sheet data were taken from the Bankscope database (Fitch-IBCA). Bank specific data allow for the investigation of individual banks' provisioning characteristics. Moreover, the high number of available observations on banks' provisions provides a rich source of information. We employed data from commercial banks only, in order to obtain a more homogeneous group of banks.
Besides, commercial banks tend to provide more balance sheet information, especially about the loan loss provisions central to our analysis. Nevertheless, data on loan loss reserves and total problem loans are less abundantly available (due to varying local regulations), restricting the final data sample used for the subsequent analysis. We estimated the regression model with ordinary least squares, using Newey and West's (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
4
Empirical results of the loan loss provisions model The correlation matrices in Annex 2 show that multicollinearity is neither a problem in this regression nor in later ones. We tested the model on influences caused by any possible correlation by regressing the lagged dependent and macroeconomic variables first, and then one by one regressing the other variables on the residuals of the preceding regression. Value and significance of all coefficients remained unchanged.
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In this table and in later ones, we present the F-test statistic of the LM test. The alternative, the number of observations times the R-squared, which has a χ 2 distribution, yields virtual identical test results. actual provision values adjust gradually over time to its assumed model values (Theil, 1971 ). An argument for gradual adjustment may be that banks observe the state of the cycle with a lag, while information with respect to the bank's balance sheet items and income accounts are also obtained with a certain lag. Another argument is that provisions for (probable) losses may be spread out over a longer term. 11 Going by the DW and the Breusch-Godfrey LM test statistics, the Koyck lag solves the autocorrelation problem. 12 Nevertheless, to remain on the safe side, we calculate the Newey and West correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariances, which correct the t-values of the coefficients for any possible remaining heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. This prevents us from wrong inferences from these tvalues, such as regarding significance (Greene, 2000) . Incidentally, the estimates from the model with a Koyck lag (λ) hardly deviate from the initial equation without gradual adjustment (after correction of the lag effect by dividing the coefficients by (1 -λ) ).
All macroeconomic and bank specific variables, except the unemployment rate, have significant effects on loan loss provisions, see the left-hand column in Table 1 . 13 In line with expectations, the GDP growth coefficient is negative, indicating that provisions rise when the business cycle falls. The elasticity between provisions as share of total assets and GDP growth is -0.23 in the short run and -0.39 in the long run. On average, when GDP growth is below 3%, provisions are not less than 60% higher than when growth is above 3%. 14 This strong cyclical effect implies that banks' provisioning behaviour is significantly procyclical and probably lacks a (far) forward looking risk assessment over the business cycle. Similar cyclical effects were found by Cavallo and Majnoni (2002) and Bikker and Hu (2002) . 15 Unemployment related to structural unbalances apparently does not increase loan loss risk significantly.
This procyclical behaviour is mitigated somewhat by the impact of banks' earnings on provisions, as banks do provision considerably more when earnings are high and vice versa. The elasticity between provisions and earnings is 0.76 in the short run and 1.29 in the long run. When 'earnings' are above 2% of total assets, provisioning is 15% higher than at lower earnings levels (bilateral effect). Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988) found the same positive relationship for the US.
Regardless of the commendable or condemnable motives behind income smoothing (as discussed above), this behaviour contributes to financial soundness of banks and reduces procyclicality.
Loan growth as a proxy of increased credit risk appears to be significant as a determinant of provisioning, supporting the views of and Lowe (2002) that risks are built up 11 Besides, just like autocorrelation, this model structure often indicates that at least one explanatory variable with lasting effects has been omitted. This comes as no surprise, as our model can use only general (balance sheet) information; after all, more detailed information about the loan portfolio and its riskiness is not available.
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The DW test statistic is not applicable to a model with a lagged dependent variable, but the high number of observations made the formula of the appropriate Durbin's h-test statistic -here and elsewhere in this paper -intractable. DW test values below 1.60 may well be within the critical limit. This limit is derived from an estimated critical lower limit, D1, which is downward-distorted as the number of explanatory variables (k) increases. The usual DW tables run to k=6 as a maximum with a DW index of 1.57. As this model and subsequent models in this and following tables all contain considerably more than six variables and considerably more observations, we may deduce that the critical D1 is well below 1.57.
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By significant (or very significant) we mean, in this paper, at the 95% (or 99%) level of confidence. 14 Note that this effect is not based on the multiple regression coefficients, but on a bilateral analysis. during economic booms. This outcome is in line with the earnings effect -broadly: provisioning in good times as a buffer for bad times -but, of course, contrary to the general procyclical provisioning as indicated by the GDP effect. Actually, in a bilateral analysis, provisions appear to be 40% higher when loan growth is negative, indicating that the cyclical (GDP growth) effect dominates the credit risk (loan growth) effect.
Banks that have higher credit risk exposure in the sense that they hold greater amounts in risky loans on the balance sheet, act at least somewhat prudently and provision more. The elasticity between provisions and loans is 0.30 in the short run and 0.51 in the long run. Banks which hold more than 70% of their assets as loans, provision 50%, 100% and 500% more than banks that have loans shares between 0.5 and 0.7, 0.3 and 0.5 and below 0.3, respectively (bilateral effects). Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988) found also a significantly positive impact of the loans share on provisioning.
At last, the capital to asset ratio is negatively correlated with provisions, what supports the capital management hypotheses: more provisioning when the capital ratio is relatively low. The elasticity between provisioning and capital is -0.42 in the short run and -0.72 in the long run. This result was also found by Ahmed et al. (1999) for the US. An alternative phenomenon contributing to these results might be that some banks are more risky in the sense that they (i) hold a greater share of risky loans (and hence incur more losses and provision more) and (ii) have a lower capital ratio. This also brings forth a negative relationship between provisioning and capital.
Many country dummies are significant; as the F-test indicates; they are also jointly significant. More than half of the country dummy coefficients show a significant positive deviation from the US. This reflects that banks in these countries provision more, taking the other explanatory variables into account.
We applied the provisioning model to the EU and individual countries as well, in order to test its robustness and to reveal possible empirical differences across countries. 16 The results for the EU as a whole, the US, Japan and France are rather similar to the total sample outcome, see, respectively, Tables 1 and 2 . The GDP effects are significantly negative, in line with expectations, a result also found by Arpa et al. (2001) for Austrian banks. For the EU as well as France, the unemployment rate is significant too, in accordance with expectations carrying a positive sign.
This supports the view that provisioning behaviour is typically procyclical. Income smoothing or prudential dynamic provisioning, as indicated by the positive coefficient of earnings, is common 15 Bikker and Hu (2002) used aggregated data on the country level instead of bank data. 16 We have chosen only countries with many banks for which the required data are available. For this reason we did not test the model for Germany, as Bankscope did not provide many observations of loan loss provisions for that country. Autocorrelation was not solved always by inclusion of a Koyck lag. For some models, inclusion of an AR(1) term worked out well. In the remaining models, the Newey and West's procedure is supposed to correct for any residual autocorrelation. in the EU, the US and France, but lacking in Japan. The credit risk indicators behave as expected in the US, but not elsewhere. 17 In Japan the loan growth coefficient is negative, which further emphasises the procyclical provisioning behaviour observed above. For the US, we also tried the share of total problem loans as a proxy for credit risk; this variable is hardly ever available for 17 Note, however, that the loans share is significant for the level of loan loss reserves, as observed in the next section. banks in other countries. Surprisingly, and contrary to our hypothesis, this variable proved not to be significant. Apparently, a clear link between the recorded impaired loans and provisioning is lacking. Kim and Kross (1998) also found an insignificant effect of the lagged nonperforming loans-assets ratio on LLP for low-capital banks, but a significantly positive impact for highcapital banks. The capital ratio coefficient is negative in these regions and countries, supporting the capital management view.
The results in the other four countries, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and the UK, are less in line with those for the whole sample. The cyclical effects as indicated by GDP growth are not significant. Income smoothing or prudential provisioning is found in Luxembourg only. The credit risk indicator "loans as a share of total assets" is significantly positive in Italy and the UK, whereas the capital ratio is significantly negative in Italy and Luxembourg. All in all, these outcomes suggest substantial differences in provisioning behaviour across countries, as could be expected given the diverging legal, regulatory or institutional frameworks, including tax and accounting regimes, market or financial structures and business cultures.
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The level of loan loss reserves
The model of Cavallo and Majnoni (2002) specifies the gross loan loss provisions as γE(d)L, see below equation (1). Although this is a proper description of ex ante provisioning, reflecting the need to reserve for expected losses in order to cover incurred losses, it lacks a direct link between the optimal level of total provisioning and the quality of the loan portfolio. Deviations of actual losses from expectations over former years are not adjusted. Moreover, when the business cycle deteriorates and the creditworthiness of the obligor gets worse, more provisions are needed, whereas the need for provisions declines when economic conditions improve. This cyclical adjustment is recognised in our equation (2), but it is ignored in the model of Cavallo and Majnoni. Finally, gross provisions may also be effected by discrete managerial decisions, such as those related to income smoothing. For this reason it is also interesting to investigate the level of loan loss reserves (LLR) -which is the accumulation of annual net provisions (LLP-BL) -instead of its annual gross provisions (LLP) only, as in Section 4:
Therefore, we apply equation (2) with provisioning LLP replaced by the level of the reserves LLR, 18 as we expect that the same explanatory variables determine the loan loss reserve level.
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Albeit that LLR, as a stock variable, is scaled by current total assets (and not by an average). The first column in Table 3 presents the results of the 'world-wide' model for LLR. As for banks from many countries data of the reserves level are not available, the world-wide sample looks like a survey sample, including only a limited subset of 12 countries. Although the level may differ substantial from gross provisions, we find that the level is effected by the explanatory variables in a similar way: almost all coefficients are significantly and have the same sign. The effects of the business cycle (GDP), income smoothing or dynamic provisioning (earnings) and credit risk (loan growth and loan share) all are similar to those in the provisioning model, be it that the t values are somewhat lower. In terms of elasticities, the effects on the LLR of GDP growth (-0.77 in the short run and -4.95 in the long-run) and of loans (0.36 in the short run and 2.29 in the long-run) are larger compared to provisioning, whereas the effect of earnings (0.12 in the short run and 0.80 in the long-run) is smaller. Only a clear relationship between reserves and capital appears to be lacking. This is remarkable, as the capital management hypothesis expected a possible interdependence between these two cushions for larger losses. Apparently, provisions react on the equity level, but there is no feedback with the level of reserves. The two credit risk proxies are highly significant in the US. For Europe, the loan share is significant too, but loan growth has no impact. A capital effect is lacking in all three models. These results confirm that reserve level behaviour is different across regions and most probably, across countries.
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Concluding remarks
Provisions appear to depend significantly on the business cycle: when GDP growth is below 3%, provisions are 60% higher than when growth is above 3%. If provisioning properly reflect the need for additional buffers, this strong cyclical effect would imply that banks' provisioning behaviour may be procyclical. As their buffers need to grow (fast) during downturns, less profits are available to supplement the (rising required) capital, possibly forcing banks to reduce lending. 22 The procyclical effect is mitigated somewhat by the impact of the banks' earnings on provisions, as banks do provision 15% more when earnings are higher (i.e. above 2% of total
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The same holds for Australia, where reserves are lower, if not significantly.
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The dummy variables appeared to be not jointly significant. Therefore, they are dropped in the final regression and shown mainly, between brackets, to indicate which countries represent Europe. Actually, the dummies hardly affect the other estimates.
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As the number of observations of LLR was low for the other countries, we did not estimate more country-specific models. assets). This 'earnings' effect might be due to dubious income smoothing or recommendable farsighted dynamic provisioning. All in all, banks do not build up sufficient buffers in fat years as reserves for lean years, to such a degree that they can smooth out the impact of the business cycle.
Banks may not want to build up such abundant reserves, but it is also probable that a clear (far) forward-looking risk assessment over the business cycle would be beyond their (or anyone's) powers. As expected, provisions depend strongly on credit risk: banks that have loan-asset ratios over 0.7, provision 50% more than banks that have loans shares between 0.5 and 0.7, and 100% more than banks that have loans shares between 0.3 and 0.5. Finally, our data support the capital management hypothesis: banks provision more when their capital ratio is low. Effects in individual countries may deviate from this general picture: substantial differences exists in provisioning behaviour across countries and regions, as might be expected given diverging legal, regulatory or institutional frameworks, including tax and accounting regimes.
Loan loss reserves are determined by the same variables as are provisions, but the effects are less strong. This is in line with expectations, as annual additions are more susceptible to outside influences than large stocks. However, no clear evidence is found either of increased provisioning during successive years of economic boom, resulting in substantially higher loan loss reserves levels, or of persisting erosion of reserves after consecutive years of recession.
Apparently, the cyclical effects, which could contribute to procyclicality, are weaker than is suggested by the provisioning results, as they no not cumulate systematically over time.
Remarkably, banks' loan loss risks are not consistently assessed as being higher during cyclical troughs than during cyclical highs.
All in all, the results underline that greater scrutiny of forward-looking provisioning and capital management will be needed, in particular with respect to cyclical fluctuations. Under Basel II, when procyclical risks may increase, this need will be even stronger, calling for a strict and adequate Supervisory Review.
ANNEX 1 Macroeconomic and bank specific determinants of loan loss provisions
The dependent variables of equation (2), the model for loan loss provisions (LLP), can be subdivided into macroeconomic variables, bank specific variables, and country dummies. This annex explains these variables in greater detail.
An economic slowdown is usually followed by an increase in bankruptcies and borrower defaults.
So, macroeconomic or business cycle indicators may reflect (future) changes in credit risk and hence potential losses. We use the growth rate of real GDP and the unemployment rate to proxy the business cycle. GDP growth is the most general and direct measure of the business cycle. We expect that prudential provisioning behaviour is negatively correlated with GDP growth.
The unemployment rate is included because it not only reflects the business cycle but also longer term and structural imbalances of the economy. (Note that the unemployment rate is a level, where GDP growth is a first difference). Usually, the unemployment follows GDP growth with a lag. We hypothesise that prudential behaviour by banks is reflected by a positive correlation with unemployment.
In the LLP model, we consider three types of bank specific variables. The first is 'earnings before taxation and provisioning', which is defined as the sum of pre-tax profit and loan loss provisions (LLP). The variable is divided by total assets (TA) -actually the average of the current and the preceding year's TA -to allow for comparison across banks of different sizes. As described in Section 2, the relationship between pre-provisioning profits and provisioning is expected to be positive for various reasons: saving for a rainy day or dynamic provisioning (true forward looking provisioning), the desire to smooth income or the wish to use favourable tax treatment of provisions.
A second important determinant of provisioning is credit risk. Expected losses are larger if the quality of the loan portfolio is poorer and, for such a portfolio, they increase more if a cyclical downturn shows up. Indicators of credit risk, however, are not abundantly available. The ratio of total problem loans to total customer loans (TPL/TCL) is probably the best proxy for credit risk, as it reflects the share of total loans that is impaired. 23 A slight drawback might be that TPL do not indicate directly the current credit risk nor the future losses, but the credit risks as materialised in the recent past. Anyhow, the ratio conveys some information about current credit risk exposure. Unfortunately, banks in most countries do not systematically report total problem loans, except in the US.
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Essentially, total problem loans consist of: (1) loans that are at least ninety days delinquent; (2) loans that have been restructured because of financial difficulty; (3) loans, although current, whose future More indirect measures of risk are credit growth and the total loans-to-assets ratio (Keeton, 1999, and Sinkey, 1991) . Some authors associate an increase in the growth rate with too optimistic expectations about future developments and with diminishing monitoring efforts (Lowe, 2002) . While excessive credit growth may well be related to an increase in risk exposure, this risk will only materialise -through an increase in problem loans -with a considerable lag: estimated around three years (Clair, 1992 , de Lis et al., 2001 . Extra provisioning when loan growth is highest would be in line with prudent provisioning, as in a dynamic provisioning regime. In a world of prudent and far forward-looking banks, the correlation between loan growth and provisioning might well be positive (unless business cycle fluctuations cannot be foreseen at all). However, the optimism that fuels credit growth is often mirrored in lower provisions, making a negative correlation between loans growth and provisioning more likely. This is exactly what was found in earlier research (Cavallo and Majnoni, 2002) . The total customer loans to total asset ratio is also an often used indicator of credit risk itself, for want of anything (e.g. Bikker and Hu, 2002) . A smaller ratio indicates that a bank invests more in less risky (government) bonds and interbank lending than in more risky customer loans.
Thirdly, the capital to total asset (CAP/TA) or equity ratio is an important bank characteristic, because it signals the capacity of banks to absorb truly unexpected shocks. Total capital consists of total equity reserves (e.g. retained earnings) and total share capital. 24 We expect a negative correlation between capital and provisions where banks manage their capital ratios by adjusting provisions, as discussed in Section 2. Alternatively, a positive correlation would be more likely, when risky banks have both more provision and capital to cover -expected and unexpected -risk.
Bank behaviour may be influenced by a country's legal, regulatory or institutional framework, tax and accounting regime, market or financial structure and business culture, to name a few important country-specific conditions. These country-specific characteristics are taken into account by inclusion of dummy variables for countries.
25
principal payments are in serious doubt; and (4) other real-estate owned (properties obtained in foreclosure).
24
Capital as calculated from the balance sheets generally differs from the regulatory capital or BIS ratio.
25
We have data from 29 countries, but only 28 country dummies. The provisions level of the country with the most bank year observations -the US -is reflected by the intercept.
ANNEX 2
Descriptive statistics of the data 
